At the end of the Qianlong reign, migrants had been clearing and tilling the old-forest hill country along the Sichuan-Hubei-Shaanxi borders around Jingxiang and the Ba mountains, where corvée exactions and official greed bred case after case of 'authority driving the people to rebel'. In 1796, as Qianlong ceded the throne, sectarians rose first at Yichang and Laifeng, and White Lotus congregations answered across five provinces — Sichuan, Hubei, Shaanxi, Henan, Gansu: Wang Cong'er and Yao Zhifu around Xiangfan, Xu Tiande and Wang Sanhuai in eastern Sichuan, preaching the 'calamity-and-change' creed, fortifying stockades among the hills and fighting on the move. The Qing armies made no headway for years and turned to scorched hamlets, walled stockades and local militias, letting provincial arms and the village levy swell; by 1804 the sects had been put down one after another — nine years and some 200 million taels of military treasure spent, exposing the rottenness of the banner and green-standard forces. Jiaqing, on taking personal rule, executed Heshen crying that officials, not omens, had driven the people out — yet the costs stood and the clerical rot remained; twenty years on, Tianli sectaries would fight their way once into the Forbidden City. Historians take the White Lotus war as the watershed of the Qing's turn from zenith to decline, and the village-militia institutions it bred as the distant source of the late-Qing Xiang and Huai armies.